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Abstract 
Several countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) have engaged in structural adjustment and 
fmancial sector reforms to either establish or strengthen their financing facilities. Unfortunately, 
the liberalization of financial markets in these countries has had little direct impact on the 
expansion of horticultural exports. 
The purpose of this paper was to examine more closely the argument about credit 
constraints and identify possible ways to improve the supply of financial services for horticultural 
exports in SSA countries. The data are drawn from case studies conducted by the Ohio State 
University team in six SSA countries including Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda, Swaziland, The 
Gambia and Uganda during 1993-94. The methodology in the case studies was limited to 
reviewing the large number of studies already available, and to supplement them with interviews 
with key informants involved in horticultural exports. 
The main conclusion that emerges from the country studies is that export financing is not 
the most important factor limiting export growth compared to removing policy distortions, poor 
infrastructure and weak support systems for entrepreneurs, and the demanding requirements for 
production and post-harvest technology including packaging, handling, and marketing. 
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FINANCING HORTICULTURAL EXPORTS IN SUB-SAHARAt~ AFRICA 
by 
Geetha Nagarajan, Richard L. Meyer, Douglas H. Graham, and Korotoumou Ouattara 
I. Introduction 
Financial sector reforms have been launched in several Sub-Saharan African (SSA) 
countries to either establish or strengthen their financing facilities. Targeted credit programs are 
being phased out. Financial institutions are being recapitalized, and several new privatized 
financial institutions are emerging in many countries. Furthermore, improved macroeconomic 
conditions and policies have provided stimuli for new foreign and domestic investments. 
Moreover, with the declining world prices for traditional agricultural commodities, SSA 
governments have placed priorities on non-traditional agricultural exports (NT AEs) that include 
horticultural produce. The response to these changing economic conditions is noticed in increased 
production, and expansion in inter and intra regional trade (World Bank, 1994). 
Liberalization of financial market, however, has had little direct impact on the expansion 
of horticultural exports in many of the SSA countries. Most of these export activities are 
primarily self-financed and, secondarily serviced by informal supplier's credit, joint ventures and 
venture capital funds. Formal fmancial institutions, especially domestic commercial banks, play 
a negligible role in financing the horticultural subsector. While established exporters can access 
international capital markets to finance some of their short-term requirements, the majority of 
medium and long-term investments are difficult to fmance by formal sources. The lack of access 
and/or the high cost of formal credit for investments and working capital has been frequently 
mentioned as a major constraint faced by exporters and producers of horticultural crops. Indeed, 
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access to adequate funds at reasonable cost has been stated by many entrepreneurs as an important 
determinant of their competitiveness among the participants in the horticultural subsector. 
Credit constraints, however, are only one among several constraints limiting horticultural 
exports. The lack of infrastructure facilities, research and extension services, international 
transportation facilities and market information profoundly impact exports of horticultural 
produce. But, policy makers and donors often perceive "finance" as a convenient vehicle for 
export promotion and isolate it as "the constraint" to justify intervention into financial markets 
through special targeted programs. For policy implications, it is important to examine if the 
financial constraint is so important to justify the emphasis given to it among the several 
constraints faced by the exporters. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine more closely the argument highlighting credit 
constraints for horticultural exports in SSA. The data are drawn from case studies conducted by 
the Ohio State University team in six SSA countries including Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda, 
Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda during 1993-94. Detailed information on individual 
countries can be found in Baydas et al.(l994), Camacho (1994), Meyer et al. (1994), Nagarajan 
et al. (1994), and Ouattara et al. (1994). The methodology in the case studies was limited to 
reviewing the large number of studies already available, and to supplement them with interviews 
with key informants involved in horticultural exports. Emphasis was given to the fresh fruit and 
vegetables subsector. The six countries chosen for the case studies have undertaken structural 
adjustment programs and emphasize horticultural exports. They, however, exhibit a wide variety 
of performances in response to macroeconomic adjustments and export promotion policies. The 
large improvements noticed in Ghana and The Gambia are in sharp contrast to deterioration 
noticed in Rwanda even before the recent tragic events that have engulfed the country (Table 1). 
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This wide variation among the case study countries, therefore, provides a rich base to compare 
and contrast some of the findings of this paper to derive policy implications. 
The paper is organized as follows: we first review and assess export promotion policies 
and financial schemes in the six countries and, second, identify possible ways to improve the 
supply of financial services for horticultural exports. Specifically, we will discuss: (i) the 
linkages between formal and informal financial markets and how they function for participants 
in horticultural export activities, (ii) some of the success stories of fmancial institutions providing 
financial services to horticultural exporters, (iii) mechanisms that facilitate producers and 
exporters to resolve their fmancial problems to compete in international markets, and (iv) examine 
the effectiveness of policy reforms in opening up new channels of fmance for horticultural 
exports. 
II. Export Promotion Policies in Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries 
The export promotion policies stimulating horticultural exports in the case study countries 
are summarized in Table 2. The ranking given to several variables is undoubtedly subject to 
different interpretations and judgements derived from publications and interviews. On the one 
hand, exchange rate policies range from good in Ghana to poor in Rwanda indicating the level 
of export support or penalization prevalent in the country. In general, a poor exchange rate 
policy favors imports over exports. While foreigners face restrictions on land use and investment 
in Uganda, they are permitted to lease and operate land in Ghana and The Gambia (World Bank, 
1994). Access to long-term leases in Ghana and The Gambia for foreigners has encouraged 
several experienced expatriates to develop large integrated horticultural operations. On the other 
hand, all the six countries have removed restrictions on export licenses, repatriation of foreign 
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exchange earnings, export taxes, imports of inputs required for exports, and price controls on 
inputs for production. In addition, liberal income tax breaks are offered to investors in Ghana, 
The Gambia, Swaziland, and Uganda (World Bank, 1994). 
The overall environment for investment in the horticultural sector, however, is mixed. 
It ranges from good in Ghana to poor in Rwanda (World Bank, 1994). Several factors contribute 
to this situation. All six countries have not yet adequately developed their infrastructure facilities 
that are important for the production and marketing of horticultural crops. Government 
investment in building public infrastructure has been very minimal. For example, in Uganda, 
public investment as a share of GDP was 4.3% while that of private investment was 9.5% in 
1993 (Bank of Uganda, 1994). This is reflected in poor internal road transport facilities and cold 
storage facilities at air and seaports. In contrast, countries such as Cote d'Ivoire, Kenya and 
Zimbabwe have invested heavily in developing their infrastructure facilities to increase 
horticultural exports (Harris, 1991). 
While financial sector reforms have been undertaken and interest rates on deposits and 
loans are liberalized, the availability of financial services for NT AEs has been limited. Export 
financing facilities from governments have been negligible. Central bank refmancing facilities 
provided to commercial banks that lend to NT AEs in The Gambia, Swaziland, and Uganda are 
rarely used due to several bureaucratic constraints and the reluctance of commercial banks 
including public commercial banks to intermediate between the exporters and the central bank 
(Nagarajan et al., 1994; Meyer et al., 1994). Indeed, the few loans granted under the Uganda 
refmance schemes were actually direct loans from the central bank to the exporters referred by 
the commercial banks. Similarly, the export guarantee schemes in Uganda and Swaziland were 
seldom used by non-traditional exporters for the same reasons as stated for use of export 
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refinancing schemes (Meyer et al., 1994) 1 Furthermore, commercial banks prefer a 100% 
collateral from the borrowers compared to the loan guarantee schemes due to: (i) loan guarantee 
schemes cover only 70-75% of losses, and (ii) settlement of claims is cumbersome. Our research 
in Ghana and Uganda also revealed that special government institutions such as the Ghana 
Investment Center, the Ghana Export Finance Company, the Uganda Export Promotion Council 
and Uganda Investment Authority have also played only a limited role in financing NT AEs 
including horticultural exports. 
The majority of government programs rarely support small producers who are not directly 
involved in exporting. Several producers function as outgrowers or as independent growers for 
exporters of horticultural crops.2 Also, new and small exporters are usually excluded from 
export finance programs since the governments have not formulated effective mechanisms to 
provide services to them. In addition, post-shipment financing and insurance are not adequately 
addressed by governmental programs despite their importance in horticultural export development 
programs. Post-shipment financing is important because of the long delays in the payments 
received from overseas importers. Post-shipment insurance is required to cover losses that 
1 Export Guarantee Scheme in Uganda is a protection for commercial banks against 
losses in pre-shipment or post-shipment loans to exporters. The guarantee is expected to 
encourage banks to increase their loans to non-traditional exporters and not to relieve the 
banks of the responsibility of monitoring risky loans. However, the scheme in Uganda is not 
well defined and is often subject to political interventions (Harris, 1991). Ideally, refinancing 
schemes should be managed independently of general monetary restrictions to maintain 
consistency in funding (Fitzgerald and Monson, 1989). 
2 Outgrowers are producers contracted by buyers to sell a prescribed quantity of a 
specific commodity at the time of harvest. Buyers may also extend fmancial and technical 
assistance to these producers for their promise of the sale of their produce at harvest time. 
Independent growers are producers who are not bound by any forward contract and are free to 
sell to the highest bidder. 
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occasionally occur m transport and shipping, especially where cold storage facilities are 
inadequate. 
In general, government programs to promote horticultural exports have often been a 
response to a perceived market failure; the more repressed the economy, the more are special 
government programs designed to offset other types of discrimination or biases toward exports. 
The lack of special government programs in the above countries can to some extent be an 
indication of liberalized economies. However, the ineffectiveness of special programs 
implemented in some of the countries need to be highlighted. Given the inefficiencies of 
government programs and policies to promote horticultural exports, the next section elaborates 
on sources of pre and post shipment finance available for horticultural exports. 
ill. Pre- and Post-Shipment Financing for Horticultural Exports 
At the pre-shipment stage, fmance facilitates investments made in production and in the 
purchasing of inputs used by producers/producer-exporters, and purchase of produce by pure 
exporters who buy from outgrowers. Post-shipment financing is required to: (i) pay for 
transportation costs, (ii) extend supplier's credit since overseas buyers generally pay on a deferred 
basis and, (iii) reduce substantial risks involved in the transportation and marketing of the 
produce in foreign markets (Rana and Nichols, 1990). 
Several financial sources exist for financing horticultural exports ranging from formal 
banks to informal money lenders. Despite the varied performance due to adjustments in 
macroeconomic policies among the case study countries, the mechanisms observed to fmance 
horticultural exports has been similar. The relative importance of diverse sources of pre and post 
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shipment finance observed in the six case study countries are summar1zed in table 3. The 
financing of horticultural exports can be characterized as follows. 
(i) Self-finance dominates both pre and post shipment financing. The funds are usually 
accumulated through retained earnings. Pure producers selling to exporters often participate in 
informal group activities such as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) to save and 
fmance their business. Several of the large producer-exporters are, however, observed to be 
conglomerates involved in other businesses that cross-subsidize their horticultural export 
operations; 
(ii) On the one hand, informal finance through supplier's credit is frequently observed at 
all levels flowing upward from producers to importers. On the other hand, a limited amount of 
buyer's credit is reported to be extended downward by exporters to their established outgrowers 
as noticed in Uganda and Madagascar. Informal fmance from friends and relatives and fellow 
traders (as noticed in Rwanda) are also commonly observed. 
(iii) Some NGOs in The Gambia, Ghana and Uganda provide grants and loans in a few 
cases to pure producers to acquire and prepare land and purchase inputs. But these Financial 
services to horticultural producers are designed largely to create income generation activities and 
to improve the nutritional level of the households rather than to boost horticultural exports; 
(iv) Joint ventures with foreign importers who provide capital and information to exporters 
are emerging to finance investment and working capital needs at pre-shipment stage, and 
marketing costs at post-shipment stage. Examples can be cited from Ghana and Uganda; 
(v) Venture capital funds are available for substantial investments at the pre-shipment 
stage. An example here is Uganda Rose exporters (Meyer et al., 1994); 
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(vi) Off-shore banks provide services at the post-shipment stage through the provision of 
letters of credit (L/Cs). The large producer-exporters with established overseas networks and 
offshore banking accounts can draw upon letters of credit from these off-shore banks to 
momentarily finance their shipments to Europe; 
(vii) Formal fmance from domestic banks in terms of direct loans is negligible at all 
levels. The majority of banks are located in urban areas and have few bank branches in rural 
areas. The share of agricultural loans in total loan portfolio of commercial banks across the 
countries has been insignificant. In addition, the cost of loans are very high compared to their 
inflation rates and that charged by off-shore banks (table 4). The large producer-exporters and 
pure exporters can draw on conventional overdraft facilities to service some part of their local 
short-term expenses, and marketing costs at post-shipment stage. Nonetheless, these overdraft 
facilities are available only for established exporters. 
The limited amount of commercial bank lending to the horticultural sector can be 
understood given the expected risks and returns involved. Formal financial institutions incur 
heavy costs in collecting and analyzing the information needed to screen loan applicants and to 
sort good from bad borrowers. Furthermore, it is difficult and costly to recover bad loans. The 
obvious consequences are a reluctance to lend, a demand for secure collateral, and a preference 
for traditional, well-established customers. Therefore, a variety of informal credit and savings 
arrangements have emerged to service household and business needs of non-traditional 
agricultural exporters. Some of these informal arrangements are a response to financial repression 
and the underdeveloped formal financial services and institutions found in these countries. 
Others, however, are based on traditional values of reciprocity, and because of their low 
transaction costs will continue to prosper even when fmancial markets become more developed. 
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Like formal finance, informal lending requires loan screening and contract enforcement, but it 
can often be done far more cheaply. 
It is unrealistic to expect commercial banks to assume the risks of fmancing the 
investment costs of horticultural export activity given the current uncertainty of returns, especially 
for all but the largest producers. Even for the largest producers it is unlikely that banks could 
move beyond their conventional overdraft facilities into project oriented term loans in which 
repayment would be subject to enterprise default risks. This is legitimately the area for venture 
capital from the owner-entrepreneurs themselves or joint ventures with foreign partners (as in 
franchising). It is logical, therefore, to expect that informal arrangements will provide many of 
the fmancial services used by the horticultural exporters in the near future while the formal 
financial system is slowly improving in a more liberalized environment. Formal financial 
institutions are, however, essential because of their ability to provide large amounts of resources 
and their specialization in lending. While they should not be expected to provide direct loans to 
horticultural exporters, they should be able to provide support services such as advance against 
collection, refinancing letters of credit, inland letters of credit, the leasing of equipment etc. The 
inability to refinance post shipment obligations was observed in Asia restricting exporters to sell 
only on importer's letters of credit terms (Rana and Nichols, 1990). There are examples of 
innovative arrangements to augment commercial bank landing to the horticultural sector. For 
example ECO bank in Ghana provides post-shipment loans to pineapple exporters to meet 
transportation costs. At the same time, Bank of Baroda in Uganda effectively uses large 
producers-exporters as conduits and guarantees for loans extended to their outgrowers. These 
strategies should be carefully studied for possible replication. Major improvements in fmancial 
services for horticultural exporters, however, requires efficient mechanisms that reduce overall 
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risks for horticultural exports. The next section, therefore, examines sources of pre- and post-
shipment insurance for horticultural exports as one way to reduce risks. 
IV. Pre- and Post-Shipment Insurance for Horticultural Exports 
Ideally, as export credit programs provide loans for pre- and post-shipment needs, export 
insurance programs would insure the export credit extended by commercial banks against 
commercial and political risks, and producer-exporters of the production, marketing and defaults 
due to deferred payments. Banks are reluctant to lend to horticultural exporters out of their 
concern for repayment of principal and, therefore, insist on full collateral. The availability of 
insurance could reduce the high collateral requirements of banks. 
The principal bearers of pre- and post-shipment risks for horticultural exports are 
summarized in table 5. While a limited amount of airline insurance is available to cover losses 
during transit, the majority of the risks are usually borne by the producers, exporters and 
importers through self-insurance. In general, government guarantee schemes such as in Uganda 
have not been effective in reducing the risks perceived by commercial banks in lending to 
horticultural exporters due to institutional weaknesses and political intrusions that delay claim 
settlements. However, private markets provide alternative instruments such as prepayment, 
private insurance through mutual trust, and self-insurance to redistribute risks. Long term 
relations established between buyers and sellers through repeated transactions and third party 
guarantees also reduce informational problems. This reduces the need for insurance to cover 
default losses due to deferred payments and the sale of poor quality produce. 
Export insurance from external agencies reduces risk costs only if premiums are less than 
the exporters' perceived losses from self-insurance or if insurers have better perceptions of risks 
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than the exporters or if insurance is subsidized. The export guarantee is primarily based on the 
availability of information on exporters, foreign buyers and markets. The presence of moral 
hazard, adverse selection and the opportunistic behavior of exporters lead insurers to overload 
premium rates so that they exceed expected losses (Fitzgerald and Monson, 1989).3 For 
example, our interviews in Ghana revealed that a full insurance coverage for the export of fresh 
horticultural produce by air requires a premium of at least ten percent of the value of the 
exported produce. On the other hand, the importers interviewed in the UK reported that the 
rejects due to poor quality usually do not exceed more than five percent of the value of total 
exported produce. There is a clear case of overpricing the insurance coverage for horticultural 
exports. Furthermore, experiences of industrial and developing countries do not provide support 
for government subsidies for export insurance since export credit insurance has not been observed 
to stimulate exports (Fitzgerald and Monson, 1989). Indeed, insured exports accounted for less 
than ten percent of total exports in Asia (Rana and Nichols, 1990). Conclusion of this analysis 
is that the provision of insurance through external insurers is difficult and costly for horticultural 
exports. Private insurance seems to be the only logical option under the current situation. The 
subsidization of insurance does not appear to be justified because of limited impact. 
V. Financing Horticultural Exports: What Role for Government, Donors and Formal 
Banks? 
The methods that entrepreneurs currently use to fmance their operations reveal the 
segmented nature of fmancial markets in the case study countries. There are three types of 
3 With moral hazard exporters sell to customers who are induced to riskier behavior; with 
adverse selection, exporters sell to less reliable customers as the more reliable drop out of the 
market with increases in premiums. 
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distinct segments among the horticultural exporters: large farms, medium-sized farms and small 
producers. The role of governments, donors and formal banks varies with the type of exporter. 
A. Large Farms 
These are highly specialized and profitable firms. The rose producing farms in Uganda 
are probably the best examples (Meyer et al., 1994). These firms started with considerable equity 
capital, obtained information about and access to the foreign markets, and are able to generate 
good profits. These types of firms can access venture capital for investment purposes, have the 
political clout to access special lines of credit and guarantees, and are creditworthy enough to 
access domestic working capital loans and overdrafts. There will always be a few of these firms 
that are successful in penetrating foreign markets. Their financial constraints will be addressed 
by the financial institutions and instruments already in place. Frequently, these types of 
entrepreneurs are already engaged in other businesses so that the new business can be cross-
subsidized by other profitable businesses. The entrepreneurs may have already established 
creditworthiness with an offshore financial institution so they can choose among alternate sources 
of fmance to get the best terms and conditions. 
B. Medium Sized Farms 
These are farms that have accumulated some assets from other businesses and decide to 
try their hand at horticultural exports. They may or may not already have access to domestic or 
offshore sources of finance. These firms represent the type for which a government or donor 
may be able to make an effective contribution. The immediate problem for these firms is not 
finance; rather it is access to markets and production technology. Before these firms can expect 
to obtain bank credit, they must establish themselves in the market place. This implies that they 
must use equity or informal credit to get started in the business. No bank will lend until the 
13 
entrepreneurs proves that they can successfully manage the firm and penetrate the high risk 
market. The firms may be able to enter a joint venture with private foreign companies that 
wants to invest in the country, but the size of operation may be too small for a venture capital 
investment. Production may come from either own and/or outgrower sources. After demon-
strating their capacity for several years, these firms may eventually obtain domestic finance, first 
for working capital, then for investment capital to expand the business. Eventually these firms 
may reach a financial constraint which will limit their growth or expansion. They will need a 
domestic financial system that is able to evaluate their performance and decide whether or not 
to grant a loan based only upon balance sheet or income information, not upon politics. 
C. Small Farms 
The last group in the segmented market consists of small producers. They lack access to 
markets, information and fmance and cannot hope to penetrate the market individually. Their 
best alternative in the short-term is to link up with an already established domestic exporter in 
an outgrower scheme, or find a direct link with an importer who is likely to extend some private 
loans to facilitate the transaction. In the short-term, these individuals need savings services to 
help manage their cash flows, but they will not get access to domestic fmance. Furthermore, they 
probably would not be able to wisely use a large amount of money if it suddenly became 
available. 
D. Role for Governments, Donors and Formal Banks 
Given the nature of the external market and the lack of experience of most producers in 
penetrating it, the government and donors need to recognize the limitations of any fmance-led 
strategy to accelerate exports. Most producers report several constraints and the most important 
ones frequently are not fmancial (see annex 1 for evidence from Uganda). Entrepreneurs must 
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go through a long learning process probably with many successes and failures before either they 
or a lender can have much confidence in their future success. 
This analysis does not suggest that a sound financial system is not necessary for 
agricultural and rural development. In the long-run, producers of both traditional and 
nontraditional crops need reliable places to save and to borrow. The financial systems in most 
SSA do not provide these services very efficiently today. The current problems of incomplete 
information, monitoring and contract enforcement in many countries suggest that an innovative 
legal and financial system is needed that will reward businesses and households with good 
performance, and exclude or punish those who misbehave. A savings-led financial strategy, 
perhaps linking formal with informal fmance, may be worth considering. Large amounts of 
government or donor funds targeted for on-lending are definitely not appropriate. They will only 
serve to strengthen those with enough political clout to access the funds and to avoid repayment. 
The challenge for any export fmancing scheme is to carefully introduce a new financial product 
that does not compromise the functions of current loan and guarantee portfolios. 
Four specific suggestions are made for monitoring financial developments and the 
performance of the horticultural sector. First, the impact of investment incentives needs to be 
monitored and possibly altered after the system has become fully developed. If investment 
incentives are going to be granted to new farms, their employment and equity impacts should be 
evaluated along with the value of total investments. By fme-tuning the incentives, it may be 
possible to tilt the production system chosen by some entrepreneurs for some products in the 
direction of relatively more labor and less capital, and relatively more production being done 
through outgrower systems rather than through plantations. 
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Second, outgrower fmancing schemes, such as the one initiated by the Bank of Baroda 
in Uganda, should be monitored to determine if loan guarantees provided by processor/exporter 
can be employed so that banks will begin to develop direct relations with outgrowers rather than 
lending indirectly through processors/exporters. Eventually, outgrowers will benefit from an 
ability to borrow directly from banks for uses not related to outgrowing, and to have greater 
flexibility in choosing where to market their products. 
Third, programs such as those implemented by the Economic Policy and Development 
Unit (EPADU) in Uganda, the Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) and, the Kenya Export 
Development Service (KEDS) are useful in providing information to potential investors and in 
the matchmaking of domestic with foreign investors. This latter function is particularly important 
in countries which impose constraints on foreign access to land. The sustainability of these 
efforts is crucial because in this dynamic field a failure to keep up-to-date about developments 
elsewhere may lead to a loss in markets. 
Fourth, there is an important role for government in providing the traditional public goods. 
Investments to improve cold storage facilities, reduce transportation costs and delays, and improve 
communication services help all exporters, but may fall outside the scope of what any single 
business can provide. SSA countries must be competitive in both on-farm production and off-
farm processing, handling and transportation if they expect to survive in the increasingly 
competitive markets for NT AEs. Careful attention must be given to determining which support 
services can only be provided by the public sector, and which are best left to the private sector 
to finance and manage. 
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VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
A conclusion that emerges from the country studies is that export financing is not the most 
important factor limiting export growth compared to removing policy distortions, poor 
infrastructure and weak support systems for entrepreneurs, and the demanding requirements for 
production and post~harvest technology including packaging, handling, and marketing. Put 
differently, no amount of external fmance could overcome these other constraints whereas one 
could imagine that an appropriate amount of non-institutional finance (self and informal finance) 
would be readily forthcoming if these other major constraints are substantially realized and 
removed. Local commercial banks are usually conservative in lending to agribusinesses and 
charge high interest rates. Large established producers/exporters, therefore, access offshore banks. 
Given the production and marketing risks due to questionable penetration in foreign markets, new 
producer/exporters are perceived as being too risky to be financed by formal banks. Start up 
capital should come from savings and informal sources. Joint ventures are frequently used in 
which the overseas importer provides some capital and information about what and how to 
produce for foreign markets. Once the firm has clearly established that it can successfully 
penetrate these markets, it may become a candidate for a working capital loan from commercial 
banks. It is also frequently the case that new producers have other businesses that can cross 
subsidize farming operations. Venture capital also has been a source of start up capital for big 
exporters. 
Once producers get established and have an opportunity to expand or need to improve 
their harvesting/post-harvesting technologies, they may experience investment capital constraints 
because of imperfections in local financial markets. It is unrealistic to expect commercial banks 
to assume the risks of financing the investment costs of horticultural export activity given the 
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current uncertainty of returns, especially for all but largest producers. Even for the largest 
producers it is unlikely that banks could move beyond their current conventional overdraft 
facilities into project oriented term loans in which repayment would be subject to enterprise 
default risks. This is legitimately the area for venture capital from the owner-entrepreneurs 
themselves or for joint ventures with foreign partners and franchising. It is logical, therefore, to 
expect that informal arrangements will provide many of the financial services used by the non-
traditional exporters in the near future while the formal financial system matures through market 
liberalization. 
Most SSA countries are undertaking financial reforms that can be expected to improve the 
long-term prospects for credit worthy agribusinesses to obtain reasonably priced loans for good 
projects. In the mean time, however, some firms will be denied credit by local banks. It is 
possible that well functioning credit guarantee schemes or export credit schemes may reduce these 
risks enough for the local banking system to make a few loans that otherwise would not be made. 
This is a country specific question. The experience of Asian countries, however, suggests that 
the impact of special export promotion programs has been limited (Rana and Nichols, 1990). 
Rather than trying to resolve difficult lending problems for a risky sector such as horticulture, 
a more productive course of action for many governments and donors appears to be the creation 
of support programs that improve access to information, market match making, venture capital 
funds, and an environment for joint ventures. 
Table 1. Comparison of Selected Macroeconomic Policy Indicators from Selected African Countries. 
Policy Indicators Ghana Madagascar Rwanda Swaziland The Gambia Uganda 
A. Fiscal Policy stance (1990-91 Y Good Poor Poor Good Good Poor 
B. Monetary Policy stance ( 1990-91 )2 Fair Fair Fair Fair Fair Fair 
C. Exchange Rate Policy stance (1990-91)3 Good Good Poor Fair Fair Fair 
D. Index scores of changes in macroeconomic 2.0 1.0 -0.3 1.7 0.3 
policies (1990-91t (Large (Small (Deterioration) na (Large (Small 
improvement) improvement) improvement) improvement) 
E. Financial Policy Stance (1990-91i Good Good Fair Good Good Good 
F. Average annual growth rate (1987-91) 
a. GDP per capita 1.3 -2.1 -5.0 4.7 0.3 2.8 
b. Agricultural growth 2.0 2.5 0.2 1.3 -2.6 4.7 
c. Manufacturing 4.5 - -0.2 -0.8 - 13.7 
d. Industry 6.4 1.1 -1.5 na 2.8 23.6 
e. Overall exports 8.1 6.1 2.1 7.6 11.3 -
G. Gross domestic saving as a % of GDP (1988-92) 6.3 5.3 2.5 21.5 6.4 0.2 
H. Inflation (%) ( 1993) 5.2 6.5 11.9 8.8 9.9 9.0 
Source: World Bank Policy Research Report, "Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results, and the Road Ahead," 1994. 
1. Ranking based on 1991 budget deficit as percentage of GDP. Good: less than 1.5% of GDP; Fair: 1.5 to 3.5 %; Poor: 3.6 to 7.0%; Very poor: 
More than 7.1%. 
2. Ranking based on 1991 seigniorage, inflation rates and real interest rates. 
Good: Low seigniorage of less than 0.5% of GDP, inflation less than 10% and 0 to 3% of real interest rates. 
Poor: High seigniorage, inflation over 1 00%, and very high negative real interest rates. 
3. Ranking based on the premium in the parallel market for foreign exchange, in 1991. 
Good: premium of0-10%; Fair: 11-30%; Poor: 31-50%; Very poor: more than 50%. 
4. Scores based on 1991 fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy stances. 
5. Ranking based on 1992 annual real interest rates. 
Good: More than 5%; Fair: 1-5%; Poor: 0 to -10%; Very poor: less than -10% (constructed by OSU). 
Table 2. Current Export Promotion Policies for Horticultural Exports in Selected African Countries, 1993/94. 
Particulars Ghana Madagascar Rwanda Swaziland The Uganda 
Gambia 
A. Environment for investors 
a. Exchange rate policy stance1 Good Good Poor Fair Fair Fair 
b. Restrictions on export licenses None None None None None None 
c. Restrictions for foreign investors None None na None None Should have 50% 
Ugandan 
involvement 
d. Restrictions on land used by foreign investors Lease only na na No restrictions Lease only No ownership rights 
e. Repatriation of foreign exchange Liberal Liberal Liberal Liberal within Liberal Liberal 
monetary 
union 
f. Export taxes Exempted Exempted na Exempted Exempted Exempted 
g. Price controls and subsidies for fertilizer from the No controls No controls No controls No controls No controls No controls 
government 
h. Imports of inputs No controls No controls No controls Limited No controls No controls 
controls 
B. Infrastructure facilities2 
a. Hard infrastructure (cold storage, roads, transport) Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor Poor 
b. Soft infrastructure 
(i) Technical assistance, ext. Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Fair 
(ii) Market information Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor Fa1r 
(iii) Match making of exporters and importers Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor Fair 
(iv) Government lobbying in overseas markets None None None None None None 
c. Public investment on infrastructure building as a % 3.2 7.5 8.1 7.0 10.3 5.0 
of GDP, 1987-91 
Table 2, cont. 
Particulars Ghana Madagascar 
c. Financial sector reform 
a. Government intervention in 
(i) interest rates for deposits None None 
(ii) interest rates for loans None None 
b. Bank restructuring Yes Yes 
D. Export financing 
a. Central Bank refinancing facilities to commercial Absent Absent 
banks lending to NTE exporters 
b. Government guarantee for export credit by Absent Absent 
commercial banks 
c. Commercial Bank financing (Public Banks? 
(i) Production Negligible Negligible 
(ii) Post-shipment Negligible Negligible 
d. Special government institutions for export Exist but poor Absent 
financing performance 
Source: Individual Country Study Papers, OSU; World Bank Policy Research Report, 1994. 
1. Ranking based on 1991 premium in the parallel market for foreign exchange. 
Good: 0-10% premium; Fair: 11-30 %; Poor: 31-50%; Very poor: 2:51% 
2. Ranking based on the presence, condition and adequacy of facilities in 1993. 
Good: Operates in good condition and satisfies demand; 
Fair: Operates in good condition but not sufficient; 
Poor: Present but is not in good condition and is not adequate 
Very poor: Absent 
3. Ranking is none, negligible, modest and ample. 
Rwanda Swaziland The Uganda 
Gambia 
Minimum None None Minimum deposit 
deposit rate rate 
Maximum None None Maximum lending 
lending rate rate 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Absent Exist but not Exist but Exist but not used 
used not used 
Absent Exist but not Absent Exist but not used 
used 
Negligible Modest Negligible Modest 
Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 
Absent Absent Absent Exist but fair 
performance 
Table 3. Relative Importance of Diverse Sources of Pre- and Post-shipment Finance of 
Horticultural Exports: Summary of Results from Selected African Countries. a 
Type of finance Sources ranked by order of importance 
I. Pre-shipment finance 
A. Pure Producers selling to Ex:Qorters 
a. Investment . Selffmance 
• NGO grants 
b. Working capital • Self fmance 
• Informal fmance 
• Outgrower credit from exporters 
• NGO grants/loans 
B. Large Producer-Exporter 
a. Investment . Self fmance (retained earnings from other businesses) 
• Informal fmance 
• Joint ventures/partnerships 
• Venture capital 
• Domestic commercial bank loans 
• Government facilities 
b. Working capital . Self finance 
• Informal finance 
• Overdrafts from domestic commercial banks 
• Joint ventures/partnerships 
. Supplier's credit if buying from outgrowers 
C. Pure ExQorters buying from 
outgrowers/indeQendent growers 
a. Investment • Self finance 
• Informal fmance 
b. Working capital . Self finance 
• Informal finance 
• Overdrafts from domestic commercial banks 
• Supplier's credit from outgrowers and independent 
growers 
ll. Post-shipment Finance 
A. First or near first-time ex12orter 
a. Transportation costs • Self-fmance/informal fmance 
• Deferred payments to airlines 
b. Marketing costs . Self-fmance 
• Informal finance 
B. Established exporter 
a. Transportation costs • Self-fmance 
• Imports 
• Deferred payments to airlines 
• Domestic commercial banks 
b. Marketing costs (packaging to fmal sales 
to the importer • Self-finance 
• Informal loans 
• Joint ventures/partnerships 
• Off-shore banks through 4c' s 
• Overdraft facilities with domestic commercial banks 
• Countries include Ghana, Madagascar, Rwanda, Swaziland, The Gambia and Uganda. 
Table 4. Formal Financial Institutions: Number, Loans and Advances to Selected Sector, and Lending Rates in Selected African 
Countries. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
Ghana1 Madagascar 
I. Total number of public and private commercial 15 6 
banks, Development banks, and cooperative banks 
II. Total number of formal bank branches 144 35 
III. Loans and advances from formal banks (% shares) 
a. Agriculture 10.6 16.9 
b. Manufacturing 27.4 54.8 
c. Trade and commerce 15.5 5.5 
d. Mining, querying, transport, construction, 46.5 22.8 
utilities, services, etc. 
IV. Nominal annual savings rate(%) 
a. Demand deposits 3-6.8 -
b. Savings deposits 11-16.0 6-8.5 
c. Time deposits (1-36 months) 14.5-22.5 13.0 
v. Nominal T-hill rates (90 days) 25.4 -
VI. Nominal annual lending rate(%) 
a. Agriculture loans 19.7-26.5 13.5-14.5 
b. Manufacturing and export loans 19.7-26.5 -
c. Commerce 29.0 -
d. Short-term loans - 20-24 
e. Term loans - 16-18.5 
VII. Real interest rates for agricultural loans (%/annum) 17.9 7.5 
Source: 
Source: 
Bank of Ghana, Annual Report, 1992. Data related to Dec. 1992. 
Camacho, 1994; Data related to 1992. 
Source: 
Source: 
Source: 
Source: 
Baydas et. al. 1994; Data related to 1992. 
Central Bank of Swaziland, Annual Report 1992/93; Data related to 1993. 
Graham et. al. 1993.; Data related to 1991. 
Bank of Uganda; Data related to 1993. 
Countries 
Rwanda3 Swaziland4 The Gambia5 Uganda6 
7 5 4 18 
165 - 13 226 
8.7 8.4 16.7 26.5 
22.1 37.9 5.1 16.5 
35.6 na 32.5 44.8 
33.6 53.4 45.7 12.2 
- - 11.0 -
7.7 6.75-9.50 12.5 1 1.0 (min) 
- 6.50-7.25 14.5 -
- 8.25 19.0 20.0 
16.67 14.25-20.50 25.0 23.0 (max) 
16.67 - 25.0 Negot. 
16.67 - 29.0 Negot. 
- - - -
- - - -
4.8 5.20 15.1 14.0 
Table 5. Principal Bearers of Pre- and Post-shipment Risks for Horticultural Exports: 
Summary of Results from Selected African Countries. 
Principal bearers of risks (by order of 
Risks importance) 
I. Pre-shipment stage 
a. Production risks due to weather, • Producers 
inputs, availability, etc. 
b. Political turmoil • Producers and Exporters 
c. Production/investment loans • Producers and exporters 
(delinquency I default losses) 
• Bank Creditor (Export Guarantee Scheme 
in Uganda) 
II. Post-shipment stage 
a. Transport delays • Shippers 
• Exporters 
• Private insurance companies 
b. Marketing risks in overseas markets • Exporters in case of consignments 
• Importers in case of fixed prices 
c. Quality deterioration risks • Exporters (until consignment accepted by 
importers) 
• Importers (until consignment accepted by 
wholesalers or supermarkets) 
• Supermarkets (once accepted from a 
distributing agent) 
d. Risks due to late payments from • Exporters 
importers 
e. Default risks from importers • Exporters 
Annex Table 1. Number of Ugandan Exporters Procuring and Marketing Non-
traditional Agricultural Exports, by Type of Constraint. 
Particulars Fruits and vegetables Spices 
I. Sample size 24 8 
II. Constraints 
a. Financial 14 6 
b. Transport (international) 14 5 
c. Poor quality produce 13 4 
d. High prices for inputs 10 5 
e. Storage facilities 13 2 
f. Cold storage at the airport 12 1 
Source: EPADU/OSU, 1994. 
Total may not add up due to multiple responses; the constraints are not arranged by ranking. 
REFERENCES 
Bank of Uganda, Quarterly Economic Report, April-June, 1993 
Baydas, Mayada et al., "Output Distribution Networks in The Agricultural Sector in Rwanda," 
The Ohio State University, June, 1994. 
Camacho, Arnoldo, "Commercialization and the Finance of Agriculture and Agribusinesses in 
Madagascar," The Ohio State University, March, 1994. 
Fitzgerald, Bruce and Terry Monson, "Preferential Credit and Insurance as Means to Promote 
Exports," Research Observer, Vol. 4, No.3, Jan. 1989, pp. 89-114 
Harris, S., "Identification of an Export Diversification Strategy for Non-Traditional Export Crops 
in Uganda," Uxbridge: High Value Horticulture Pic., 1991. 
Meyer, Richard L., "The Horticultural Sub-Sector in Uganda: Marketing and Financial Strategies 
to Service Alternate Markets," The Ohio State University, June, 1994. 
Nagarajan, Geetha et al., "Prospects for Horticultural Exports to European Markets from The 
Gambia," The Ohio State University, June, 1994. 
Rana, Pradumna R. and Bruce Nichols, "Overview," in Export Finance: Some Asian Examples, 
Manila: Asian Development Bank, 1990. 
Ouattara, Korotoumou et al., "Growth Prospects for Ghana Horticultural Exports," The Ohio 
State University, June, 1994. 
World Bank, Adjustments in Africa: Results, and the Road Ahead, Washington, D.C.,: World 
Bank Policy Research Report, 1994. 
25 

